Showing posts with label Monarchy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Monarchy. Show all posts
Wednesday, 21 March 2012
Conventions
Let’s be honest about this. National leaders are rarely shrinking violets. They have navigated the highways and byways of government to reach the very top of the political ladder. There are thousands of people who have run for Parliament, but only 650 sit in the House of Commons. Many MPs become mere footnotes in (local) history – but Members of the Cabinet have risen through the ranks to reach the very top. That takes a certain amount of toughness – and ability to see off competitors.
This is important to remember when the power of conventions in the British system is considered. These very powerful people feel constrained to obey conventions – even though the convention may stop them achieving their goals, and despite the fact that conventions are, by definition, unenforceable by the Courts.
So why are they obeyed? Political Scientists treat politicians (and other constitutional players) as economic actors. Their behaviour is determined by their wish to gain and maintain power (see David Mayhew on “Congress the Electoral Connection”). It would be nice, though sadly naïve, to imagine that conventions are kept purely out of respect for tradition. They are observed because the costs of breaching a convention are greater than the benefits to be gained. The convention that the Monarch always gives the Royal Assent to bills passed by both Houses of Parliament keeps the Monarchy safe from republicanism. The short term advantage for a Queen or a King of refusing Assent would be bought at the cost of political controversy that could ultimately end in the removal of an unelected hereditary post filled by virtue of birth not merit. Even if the refusal to grant Assent were popular on that particular issue – people would be concerned that the Monarch could thwart the popular will at any time. The costs of killing a convention could return to haunt the person who did it. A Prime Minister could refuse to resign after losing a vote of confidence – but probably at the expense of tearing his party apart. The advantages of upholding conventions may be long term – but they are great.
For almost a hundred and fifty years there was a “convention” that US Presidents would hold the office no longer than the two terms that Washington himself served. When FDR ‘broke’ this convention, it was turned into a constitutional requirement (22nd Amendment). The flexibility – which could have been useful should the end of a two-term presidency come at a time of extraordinary crisis – has been lost. The flexibility within the British constitution is highly prized – and powerful leaders know that it could be costly to give it up for mere short term advantage.
This is important to remember when the power of conventions in the British system is considered. These very powerful people feel constrained to obey conventions – even though the convention may stop them achieving their goals, and despite the fact that conventions are, by definition, unenforceable by the Courts.
So why are they obeyed? Political Scientists treat politicians (and other constitutional players) as economic actors. Their behaviour is determined by their wish to gain and maintain power (see David Mayhew on “Congress the Electoral Connection”). It would be nice, though sadly naïve, to imagine that conventions are kept purely out of respect for tradition. They are observed because the costs of breaching a convention are greater than the benefits to be gained. The convention that the Monarch always gives the Royal Assent to bills passed by both Houses of Parliament keeps the Monarchy safe from republicanism. The short term advantage for a Queen or a King of refusing Assent would be bought at the cost of political controversy that could ultimately end in the removal of an unelected hereditary post filled by virtue of birth not merit. Even if the refusal to grant Assent were popular on that particular issue – people would be concerned that the Monarch could thwart the popular will at any time. The costs of killing a convention could return to haunt the person who did it. A Prime Minister could refuse to resign after losing a vote of confidence – but probably at the expense of tearing his party apart. The advantages of upholding conventions may be long term – but they are great.
For almost a hundred and fifty years there was a “convention” that US Presidents would hold the office no longer than the two terms that Washington himself served. When FDR ‘broke’ this convention, it was turned into a constitutional requirement (22nd Amendment). The flexibility – which could have been useful should the end of a two-term presidency come at a time of extraordinary crisis – has been lost. The flexibility within the British constitution is highly prized – and powerful leaders know that it could be costly to give it up for mere short term advantage.
Thursday, 5 November 2009
The Queen's Private Secretary
Most of the key players in the British constitutional system are well known. The leading members of the Executive are the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. The current list can be found here. Details of senior civil servants can be found here. Members of the Legislature are listed at Parliament's website. The Supreme Court, which is the highest court of the judicial system has a very informative website which can be accessed here.The British Constitution is not set out in a single document. Many key 'rules' are known as conventions. These have been described as non-legally binding (in other words they would not be enforced by the Courts) - but which the political actors regard themselves as bound by. For example it is now a convention that the Queen will sign any bill presented to her which has been passed by both Houses of Parliament. If she failed to do so, she could not be ordered to sign by a Court, but - if asked - the Queen would say that she has no alternative but to sign.
What happens if a constitutional crisis arises? Who would sort things out? The key to understanding the British constitution is that such crises would be resolved - not by a legal solution (for example in the USA the Supreme Court might be regarded as the final arbiter in a dispute over the Constitution) - but by a political solution.
When there was controversy over Edward VIII's proposed marriage to a divorcee (1936) - or when there was a constitutional crisis over the House of Lords blocking the Budget (1909-10) - the key political actors, between themselves, sorted out a solution.
One individual who has often played a key role is the Private Secretary to the Monarch. Vernon Bogdanor devotes a whole chapter of his 1995 book "The Monarchy and the Constitution" to this office holder. He claims that "the office...has become crucial to the working of constitutional monarchy in Britain." It is a chapter worth reading!
The official description of the post on the UK Monarchy's website can be accessed here. The photograph accompanying this post is that of Lord Knollys - Private Secretary to Edward VII and George V.
Thursday, 24 September 2009
The Act of Settlement 1700
The Act of Settlement is one of the key statutes that - along with other Statutes (also known as 'Acts of Parliament'); cases; and other non-legal rules such as conventions - make up the so-called 'unwritten constitution" of Britain. It not only defines who can be the Head of State, but adds to the Bill of Rights in laying down the limits of the power of the monarch relative to Parliament.It was designed to ensure that England never again became a Catholic country. The only legitimate line of descent of the Crown was through the Protestant branch of the royal family. To make doubly sure anyone who becomes a Catholic is disqualified to be monarch. This law is still in force!
The text of the Act is available here.
Monday, 9 February 2009
Tom Paine wrote one of the great works which influenced thinking in America at the time of the revolution. If you haven't read Common Sense, I strongly recommend it! It is available online at http://www.ushistory.org/paine/commonsense/singlehtml.htmHis chapter "Of Monarchy and Hereditary Succession" greatly influenced me. We should never forget that, although Paine played a key role in developments in America and then France, he was an Englishman. But as the Bible says "A prophet is not without honour, save in his own country". Perhaps I am being a bit unfair - Tom Paine has many supporters in the UK.
His ideas on a hereditary monarch are backed by "Republic" - the Campaign for an Elected Head of State. You can visit the website at - http://www.republic.org.uk/
It states:
Britain still retains a political culture centred on "Her Majesty's Government" - not ours, but hers, a powerful reminder in days gone by of where our place was in the system. The idea of royal "ownership" continues to pervade this culture and to reinforce the idea that the system is not our own.
Despite the extravagant costs of monarchy, and the increasingly erratic behaviour of the royals, our arguments are concerned with democracy, the principle that this is our country and we should choose our heads of state.
We should have the right to elect and hold to account all who hold public office and such people must remember that they are there to serve us, and not vice versa.
It is time to claim the right to our own country and to choose our Head of State.
Labels:
Monarchy,
Republic,
Thomas Paine
Thursday, 30 October 2008
The Monarchy
Lord Taverne will ask the Government at question time "whether they plan to review the constitutional role of the monarchy". It's an interesing question on a number of levels. While in practical terms the monarch has very limited powers (Conventions govern the use of her powers - Bills which have been passed by both Houses of Parliament must be signed by the Monarch to become law, but by a 300 year old convention the Monarch doesn't refuse; the Queen "chooses" her Prime Minister - but her choice is limited by convention) - the Monarchy is central to the system.Parliament is called by the Monarch - and each session she tells members of both Houses in the 'Queen's Speech' what she would like them to consider (the speech is written by the Government); She dissolves Parliament (on the advice of the Prime Minister). It is "Her Majesty's Government" (often called HMG); We refer to the Queen's courts and judges.
The question could touch on the so-called 'Royal Prerogative' - defined by Dicey as "... the remaining portion of the Crown's original authority, and it is therefore ... the name for the residue of discretionary power left at any moment in the hands of the Crown, whether such power be in fact exercised by the King himself or by his Ministers". Key parts of the Prerogative are the subject of proposals for reform. (for further details see http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm71/7170/7170.pdf and the follow up documents on http://governance.justice.gov.uk/).
There aren't many Republicans in the House of Lords - but it might provoke some interesting exchanges.
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