One of the key provisions of the
Bill of Rights 1689 - and a central principle of the British Constitution - is that the Courts cannot question what is said or done in Parliament. The current Clerk of the House of Commons has warned that this may be compromised by provisions in the
Parliamentary Standards Bill - which is set to be pushed through all its Commons stages today; tomorrow and Wednesday.
He writes in a memorandum to the Justice Committee
1. This memorandum addresses privilege aspects of the Parliamentary Standards Bill. Since the Bill seeks to make statutory provision in relation to matters which fall with Parliament’s exclusive cognisance or may affect proceedings in Parliament, it affects the established privileges of the House of Commons, thereby upsetting the essential comity established between Parliament and the Courts...
17. Clause 10(c) allows any evidence of proceedings in Parliament to be admissible in proceedings for an offence under clause 9. This is a very wide qualification of the principle under Article IX of the Bill of Rights that such evidence is not admitted. It would mean that the words of Members generally, the evidence given by witnesses (including non-Members) before committees and advice given by House officials on questions, amendments and other House business could be admitted as evidence in criminal proceedings. This could have a chilling effect on the freedom of speech of Members and of witnesses before committees and would hamper the ability of House officials to give advice to Members.
18. It is for consideration whether the scope of this qualification could be narrowed – as in the current draft Bribery Bill – by confining the provision to the words or actions in Parliament of the Member concerned in the specific case. This reflects the compromise agreed to last time this issue was considered by a Parliamentary committee – the Joint Committee on the Draft Corruption Bill in 2003. At that time the Liaison Committee expressed concern that a wider provision might deter witnesses from speaking frankly before select committees.
19. However, even the qualification were narrowed, the accused Member would be put in the position of having his words used against him, without being given the opportunity to adduce words spoken by other Members which might tend to exculpate him. This would create a very real risk of the trial being unfair and contrary to the requirements of Article 6 ECHR.7 This demonstrates the difficulty caused by admitting evidence of proceedings in Parliament: either the admission is on such a wide basis that it has a chilling effect on Parliamentary proceedings (by prejudicing or effectively removing the right of free speech), or it is on such a narrow basis that the fairness of trials is put at risk.
20. I have argued in evidence to the current Joint Committee on the draft Bribery Bill that there is a case for not tinkering with parliamentary privilege on a piecemeal basis but implementing the recommendation of the Joint Committee on parliamentary privilege in 1999 that there should be a Parliamentary Privileges Act. Such an act would clarify the application of provisions of Article IX; define Parliament's control of its internal affairs and replace existing statute on the reporting of parliamentary proceedings. The experience of the Defamation Act of 1996, intended to address one perceived anomaly of parliamentary privilege, has led to others. The provision of section 13 of the Act was later held to undermine the collective right of the House to immunity in respect of proceedings by allowing an individual Member to waive privilege. Other difficulties of a practical nature where more than one Member was involved led the Joint Committee to recommend repeal of the section. Other encroachments on parliamentary privilege suggest that a piecemeal approach to defining and defending the Houses' legitimate right to function effectively is no longer sufficient. The Australian model for a Parliamentary Privileges Act is at hand for adaptation toBritish circumstances.
21. Lastly, Clause 11(4) and (7) suggests that the actions of the Speaker of the House of Commons could be the subject of judicial review. Since they concern the conferring of a statutory power on the IPSA to carry out a ‘registration function’ pursuant to an ‘agreement’ under Clause 11(4), judicial review of the making of an agreement and of its scope could be expected. Conceivably, a decision of the Speaker not to make an agreement could also be the subject of an application for judicial review.
I picked up a book this week called "Hollywood Goes to Washington" by Michael Coyne. It discusses the various films that portray politics in the USA. I'm particularly interested in plays and films that are set in either Congress or Westminster.
